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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3899 
___________ 
 
SHAWN BULIFANT; GARY HUGHES; 
DANIEL LOPER; JAMES MCCLINTOCK; 
CHRISTOPHER VERNON, 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
DELAWARE RIVER & BAY AUTHORITY 
   
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.N.J. No. 1-14-cv-07384) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on Friday, June 16, 2017 
 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 7, 2017) 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Shawn Bulifant, Gary Hughes, Daniel Loper, James McClintock, and Christopher 
Vernon appeal the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, the 
Delaware River & Bay Authority (DRBA), related to their claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm 
in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings on Hughes’s and McClintock’s 
age discrimination claims. 
I. Background 
Appellants are crew members who have worked as seasonal employees for the 
DRBA’s ferry services at various points between 2006 and the present.  Appellants 
applied for full-time positions with the DRBA in response to job postings in February 
2012, September 2012, and January 2013.  With limited exception,1 Appellants received 
interviews each time they applied, but ultimately were not selected for any of these full-
time positions.   
In making its hiring decisions for these positions, the DRBA employed a 
standardized approach in which the same panel of four DRBA employees interviewed 
every candidate for a given position using the same preset questions that focused on four 
core competencies—functional and technical skills, safety, customer service, and peer 
relationships.  Based on the candidates’ answers, each panelist assigned the candidates a 
numeric score in each competency.  The scores of the four panelists were then added 
                                                 
1 Vernon did not receive an interview for the February 2012 position, and did not 
apply for the January 2013 position.  
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together, and the candidates were ranked in order of their total scores.2  These rankings, 
as well comments from the panel on each candidate, were then submitted to human 
resources and the managing director for the position in question.   
Although there is no record of what occurred when the rankings were submitted 
for the specific positions at issue in this case, the DRBA’s executive director testified that 
the rankings are always used as an “important guide” in the ultimate selection.  App. 790.  
He also testified that while managing directors and human resources “have … the ability 
to deviate somewhat from the strict numerical rankings in order to achieve other goals . . .  
such as diversity or other specific goals,” App. 788, “a record is made of why [the 
DRBA] picked who [it] picked” and an “explanation” is given when such deviation 
occurs, App. 791. 
For the February 2012 position, the DRBA followed its rankings to a T, turning 
Appellants down in favor of those who ranked above them numerically.3  For the 
September 2012 position, however, the DRBA deviated from its standard practice, hiring 
the first-through-fourth ranked candidates, ages 52, 52, 24, and 52, but skipping over 
Hughes and McClintock, ages 61 and 53, and ranked fifth and sixth, in favor of the 
                                                 
2 The record reflects that the competencies were not given equal weight when 
calculating a candidate’s total score but does not disclose how they were weighted.   
 3 We reference the February 2012 position for its relevance to reviewing the 
DRBA’s general hiring practices and not as the basis for a claim in and of itself.  The 
District Court held that any claims with respect to that position were time barred because 
Appellants missed the deadline to file a related charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission—a prerequisite to filing an age discrimination claim in federal 
court, see 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)—and Appellants do not dispute this ruling on appeal.    
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seventh, eighth and ninth-ranked candidates, ages 35, 26, and 33.4  Despite its executive 
director’s testimony that he would “be surprised” if a written explanation addressing this 
deviation did not exist, App. 792, the DRBA has not produced any contemporaneous 
records documenting the rationale behind the decision.  Thereafter, for the January 2013 
position, the DRBA resumed its strict adherence to its rankings, rejecting Appellants in 
favor of the two highest-rated candidates.   
Appellants filed suit, asserting that they were not hired for these positions due to 
their age in violation of the ADEA.5  In addition, because Appellants submitted 
complaints to the DRBA regarding this alleged age discrimination after their first round 
of unsuccessful applications, Appellants also asserted they were not hired for the two 
later positions in retaliation for their complaints—likewise a violation of the ADEA.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the DRBA on the ground that, even 
assuming Appellants had established prima facie cases of discrimination and retaliation 
under the ADEA, they had not established that the DRBA’s articulated legitimate reasons 
for their hiring decisions were pretextual.  This appeal followed. 
II. Discussion6 
                                                 
4 The remaining, lower-ranked, Appellants also were not offered a position. 
5 In their complaint, Bulifant, Loper and Vernon also assert they were unlawfully 
excluded from applying for additional positions in November 2011 and January 2012.  
The District Court concluded that these positions, which were open to internal applicants 
only, “d[id] not form the basis for [Appellants’] claims,” App. 8 n.3, and Appellants have 
not challenged that finding.  
6 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Faush v. 
Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate where the moving party has established that “there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact” and, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 
Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013).  Because we conclude that a 
dispute of material fact remains only with respect to Hughes’s and McClintock’s age 
discrimination claims, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in 
the DRBA’s favor on those claims and will affirm on all others.  
A.  Appellants’ Age Discrimination Claims  
To prevail on their ADEA discrimination claims, Appellants must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that age was the “but-for” cause of the DRBA’s decision 
not to hire them.  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009).  Because 
Appellants rely on circumstantial evidence to prove their case, we evaluate their claim 
using the three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.7  See Willis v. 
UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015).  That 
                                                 
7 In addition to arguing that they have carried their burden under McDonnell 
Douglas, Appellants also contend that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not 
applicable because they have offered “direct evidence” of discrimination—that is, 
“evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of [discrimination] without 
inference or presumption.”  Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 829 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  The District Court carefully parsed Appellants’ allegedly 
“direct” evidence, and we agree with its conclusion that none of this evidence proves 
discrimination, and much of it, when considered in context, does not even support such 
an inference.   
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framework requires a plaintiff opposing summary judgment to satisfy the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination; if he does so, the burden of production 
then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
hiring decision; and if the defendant articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to 
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s proffered 
explanation was pretextual.  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009).  
If the plaintiff succeeds in “demonstrating sufficient evidence to allow a finder of fact to 
discredit the employer’s proffered justification,” summary judgment is not appropriate.  
Burton, 707 F.3d at 427.  
To state a prima facie case of age discrimination at the first step of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) the plaintiff is at least forty years 
old; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision; (3) the plaintiff was 
qualified for the position in question; and (4) the plaintiff was ultimately [not hired in 
favor of] another employee who was sufficiently younger so as to support an inference of 
a discriminatory motive.”  Willis, 808 F.3d at 644.  All five Appellants satisfy this initial 
burden.8  At the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, however, the 
rankings establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the DRBA’s failure to hire 
Bulifant, Loper, and Vernon for any position, and its failure to hire Hughes and 
McClintock for the positions other than the one posted in September 2012, as discussed 
                                                 
8 Appellee does not appear to dispute Appellants’ qualifications for the relevant 
positions, and the comments accompanying Appellants’ interview rankings generally 
reflect that the DRBA considered them to be qualified applicants.   
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further below.  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that, to the extent the 
DRBA followed its own rankings system, its process was “formal, open, objective, and 
documented,” App. 29,  and, thus, Appellants have not demonstrated for these positions 
that the DRBA’s strict adherence to this system was a pretext for discrimination.9  
The DRBA cannot rely on its rankings, however, to explain its failure to hire 
Hughes and McClintock for the September 2012 position.  Instead, although no 
contemporaneous explanation was documented, the DRBA now offers the non-
discriminatory explanations that (1) the comments accompanying the rankings justified 
its hiring decisions; and (2) its hiring of lower-ranked applicants was necessary to 
promote diversity in its workforce.  Although these explanations were enough to shift the 
burden of production back to Appellants, Hughes and McClintock have offered enough 
competing evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude these explanations were 
pretextual.  
                                                 
 9 Appellants contend that the DRBA’s reliance on its rankings is pretextual 
because the rankings are “entirely subjective in nature.”  Appellants’ Br. 33.  While we 
have cautioned that “low evaluation scores may be a pretext for discrimination,” Tomasso 
v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006), Appellants have offered nothing more 
than their own self-serving assessments that they were more qualified than higher-ranked 
applicants and an unsubstantiated hearsay statement to support their contention that they 
were scored less favorably than other applicants due to their age.  Moreover, while 
interviewers were given considerable flexibility when making their assessments, the 
process was not as opaque as Appellants claim.  Each interviewer rated each applicant in 
four specific job-related categories, and, unlike the case of Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 
492 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2007) on which Appellants rely, the interviewers supported their 
numeric rankings with specific comments reflecting their impressions of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the individual candidates.  See Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 617 (noting 
“[Appellant’s] score sheets contain no notes or comments on her interview 
performance”).  
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One way an ADEA plaintiff may demonstrate pretext is by “point[ing] to evidence 
that would allow a factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s reason for the adverse 
employment action.”  Willis, 808 F.3d at 644.  Such evidence “must indicate such 
weaknesses . . . in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons” that a reasonable fact-
finder could “conclude the employer’s actions could not have been for nondiscriminatory 
reasons.”  Id. at 644-45 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Hughes and McClintock have met this burden by identifying three significant 
weaknesses in the DRBA’s proffered justifications.  First, they point to the DRBA’s 
deviation from its rankings system in favor of three significantly younger applicants with 
no contemporaneously documented explanation.10  This evidence is compelling, as the 
DRBA consistently followed its rankings when hiring for the other positions, and has 
acknowledged that it presumptively follows the rankings—so much so that it has a policy 
of creating a written record documenting its reasons in the event of a deviation.  Thus, 
what occurred here—with three applicants in their twenties and thirties leapfrogging two 
applicants in their fifties and sixties with no documented explanation as to why—is 
significant evidence of pretext in itself.  
                                                 
10 The DRBA asserts that because Hughes and McClintock could not identify at 
their depositions the ages and qualifications of the lower-ranked candidates selected 
ahead of them, they cannot use these candidates as “comparators” for their discrimination 
claims.  Appellee’s Br. 24 n. 30.  Appellants have consistently identified these younger, 
lower-ranked applicants who were hired over them in their briefing, and their inability to 
identify their comparators by name and to expound on their backgrounds while being 
deposed is immaterial to Appellants’ claims.  
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Second, Hughes and McClintock cast doubt on the DRBA’s supposed reliance on 
the comment sheets accompanying the applicants’ numeric rankings.  Hughes and 
McClintock are correct that the comments sheets are overwhelmingly positive about all 
five applicants in question, and thus do little to explain why the three younger applicants 
were selected and Hughes and McClintock were not.   
Third, Hughes and McClintock undercut the DRBA’s post-hoc explanation that its 
deviation from its rankings was necessary to promote diversity in its workforce.  While 
the seventh and ninth-ranked applicants may provide diversity that Hughes and 
McClintock do not, the eighth ranked applicant—the youngest of the five by almost ten 
years—is, like Hughes and McClintock, a white male.  Moreover, although the DRBA’s 
executive director, when deposed as part of this lawsuit, identified diversity as a potential 
reason why the DRBA may have deviated from its rankings, he also testified that a 
written record explaining that deviation normally would have been generated.  As noted 
above, no such record was generated here.  
The District Court did not explicitly rely on either of these justifications as its 
basis for granting summary judgment in the DRBA’s favor, but instead held that because 
the first, second, and fourth-ranked applicants who were hired were also over forty, “age 
does not appear to the reason why” McClintock and Hughes were not hired.  App. 30.  
The District Court reasoned that, had age been the reason Hughes and McClintock were 
not offered positions, “it would follow” that the DRBA would have “skipped over” these 
older applicants as well.  App. 29.   
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While we commend the District Court’s careful assessment of the factual record, 
we conclude its reasoning misconceives Appellants’ burden under the ADEA.  The 
ADEA does not require that Appellants prove the DRBA had a blanket policy of not 
hiring any crew member over a certain age, but only that Appellants specifically were not 
hired because of their age.  See El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Title 
VII operates not primarily to the benefit of racial or minority groups, but to ensure that 
individual applicants receive the consideration they are due”); Pivirotto v. Innovative 
Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Even if the plaintiff was replaced by 
someone within her own class, this . . .  does not establish that the employer did not fire 
the plaintiff on the basis of her protected status.”).  Thus, while evidence of the ages of 
other hired applicants may be relevant to whether age was the “but-for cause” of the 
DRBA’s decision, Gross, 557 U.S. at 178,  it does not establish that the DRBA’s 
proffered justifications were legitimate, and not pretextual, as a matter of law.  
In sum, Hughes and McClintock have offered “sufficient evidence to allow a 
finder of fact to discredit the employer’s proffered justification.”  Burton, 707 F.3d at 
427.  Appellants will bear the heavier burden at trial of “convinc[ing] the factfinder that 
not only was the employer’s proffered reason false, but the real reason [they were not 
hired] was impermissible discrimination.”  Willis, 808 F.3d at 645.  At this stage, 
however, they have offered enough evidence of pretext to put their case before a jury.11  
                                                 
11  The DRBA makes much of the fact that three interviewers on the September 
2012 interview panel were older than forty.  Even accepting the non-binding opinions 
cited by the DRBA for the proposition that the age of the decision-maker is relevant in an 
ADEA case, the members of the interview panel were not the relevant decision-makers 
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B.  Appellants’ ADEA Retaliation Claim  
We also evaluate Appellants’ retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework.  Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 2005).  To establish a prima 
facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) that s/he engaged in a protected 
employee activity; (2) that s/he was subject to adverse action by the employer either 
subsequent to or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) that there is a 
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.”  Id.    
Appellants have not made this prima facie showing because, even assuming they 
satisfied the first and second prongs, they have failed at the third prong to establish a 
causal connection between their protected activity and the DRBA’s decision not to hire 
them.  That is, the DRBA has posited Appellants were not hired due to their lower 
rankings, and, apart from Hughes’s and McClintock’s retaliation claims with respect to 
the September 2012 position, Appellants have not demonstrated to the contrary.  
In contrast to their discrimination claims, however, Hughes and McClintock also 
have not demonstrated the “causal connection” necessary to support a retaliation claim 
vis-a-vis the September 2012 position.  Such a connection is established when the 
“proffered evidence, looked at as a whole” supports an inference of causation.  Kachmar 
v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).  The evidence on which 
                                                                                                                                                             
for purposes of Hughes’s and McClintock’s claims.  In fact, it is clear from the record 
that the interviewers themselves did not discriminate at all, as they ranked Hughes and 
McClintock more favorably than the eventually-hired, younger applicants.  Thus, the ages 
of the interviewers here do not “mitigate[] any inference of pretext from [the] DRBA’s 
bypass of Hughes and McClintock.”  Appellee’s Br. 25.  
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Hughes and McClintock rely consists of three documents: (1) a May 29, 2012 letter to the 
DRBA’s executive director protesting, among other things, the organization’s prior age 
discrimination; (2) a March 25, 2013 EEOC discrimination charge filed by Loper; and (3) 
a March 31, 2013 letter to the DRBA’s diversity manager protesting its past age 
discrimination.  None of this evidence, however, gives rise to an inference of causation.  
Two of these documents, the May 29th letter to the DRBA and Loper’s EEOC 
charge, fail because Loper is the only signatory to either document, and Hughes and 
McClintock have not offered any evidence that reflects the DRBA knew they were 
involved in preparing these complaints prior to its decision not to hire them.12  And 
although the March 31st letter is signed by all five Appellants, the DRBA, by that date, 
had already finalized its hiring for all but one of the September 2012 positions, with the 
one remaining hire finalized the following day.  Thus, while “temporal proximity” 
between a complaint and an adverse action may sometimes create an inference of 
retaliation, Kachmar 109 F.3d at 177, the inference from this record, if anything, goes the 
other way, as Hughes and McClintock would be hard pressed to show (and indeed, have 
offered no evidence) that, in the one-day gap at issue, the DRBA based even that final 
adverse decision on Appellants’ letter.  Without more, Appellants have not created the 
inference of causation necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the 
ADEA.  
                                                 
12 Although all five Appellants testified that they signed a different version of the 
May 29th letter, no such letter has been produced by either party, and there is no evidence 
that this version was ever received by the DRBA.   
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III. Conclusion  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
